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Abstract
With the surge in cyber incidents in recent years, many linked to human error, governments are
quite naturally developing security campaigns to improve citizens’ security behaviour. However, it
remains not only unclear how successful these campaigns are in changing behaviour, but also
what established behaviour change techniques—if any—they employ in order to achieve this goal.
To investigate this, we analysed 17 government-sponsored cybersecurity campaign materials. We
coded the materials for their intervention functions according to the Behaviour Change Wheel and
their behaviour change techniques in accordance with the Behavioural Change Technique
Taxonomy (version 1). Our findings show that security campaigns are often focused on education
and increasing awareness, under the assumption that as long as citizens are aware of the risk, and
are provided with information on how to improve their security behaviour, behaviour will change.
Additionally, there is a lack of published effectiveness studies investigating the direct effects of a
governmental cybersecurity campaign. Proposed improvements to security campaigns are
discussed.
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Introduction
Consumers (and citizens) are common victims of cybercrimes. A
recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
[1] estimated the annual global cost of cybercrime to be $600bn,
approximately 1% of global GDP. The FBI division tasked with
cybercrime (IC3) estimated that US citizens paid in excess of $1bn
per annum on ransomware alone, and that currently cybercrime
reporting covers only around 10–12% of the actual cybercrime
committed [2]. The most recent statistics from the UK’s Office for
National Statistics estimated that citizens of England and Wales
were victims of 4.5 million cybercrimes in the year ending March
2018. Of these, the majority (3.2m) were fraud-related, with the
remaining (1.2 m) victims of computer-misuse (e.g. hacking).
While rates of victimization through computer viruses have fallen
[3]—mostly due to the increase in use and capabilities of anti-
virus solutions—cybercrime remains the most likely crime to be
suffered by UK citizens [4], with an estimated £4.6bn stolen from
UK citizens alone [5].
Amongst national governments, there is a recognition that
creating a secure digital environment requires not only technical
solutions but also for responsibility to be taken by both businesses
and citizens. For instance, the UK Governments’ National
Cybersecurity Strategy 2016–2021 [6] notes that, ‘we lack the
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skills and knowledge to meet our cybersecurity needs . . .. The
public is also insufficiently cyber aware’ [6]. The National Cyber
Strategy published in 2018 by the US Whitehouse similarly notes
a priority as being to, ‘improve awareness and transparency of
cybersecurity practises to build market demand for more secure
products and services’ [7].
As a response, many governments run cybersecurity awareness
and skills campaigns with the goal of improving citizens’ cybersecur-
ity hygiene, awareness and skills, often at considerable cost. For in-
stance, the UK Government’s ‘cyber aware’ campaign was reported
as costing £12m, equalling over £6 per website visitor [8]. The
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, formed in 2018, has a budget
of over 500m CAD over 5 years, and increasing public understand-
ing (via the ‘Get Cyber Safe’) as a large part of its remit [9]. It there-
fore is reasonable to ask if these kinds of campaigns use the best
evidence-based approaches to behaviour change, and if they are ef-
fective in changing citizens’ awareness or behaviour in such a way as
to increase their protective behaviour or reduce risk-taking in terms
of cybersecurity. More specifically, we wonder if the preponderance
of terms such as ‘aware’ and ‘awareness month’ in reviewing public
cybersecurity campaigns suggests a focus on raising awareness as the
prime behaviour change mechanism.
Traditionally, governmental campaigns to influence citizens’ be-
haviour are based on the assumption that making people aware of a
risk will lead them to act to counter that risk. In the past, this has
taken the form of fear-based messages, sometimes accompanied by
additional information to remove the threat (e.g. around smoking
cessation; e.g. see [10]), sometimes not [e.g. early AIDS awareness
campaigns; see [11]. In keeping with findings from other domains,
awareness campaigns alone are not enough to change cybersecurity
behaviour [12], and there have been recent calls to expand aware-
ness campaigns, so that they are aimed at changing security behav-
iour [13, 14]. Indeed, there is research in this area that shows that
mainstream behavioural change components such as self-efficacy
[15, 16] or applying the health belief model [17] can positively influ-
ence cybersecurity behaviour. Increasingly the focus of intervention
studies in the field of cybersecurity has moved towards skills rather
than simply awareness or fear messages [14]. For instance, a recent
study of over 2000 people across five EU countries [18] found that
messages focused on coping strategies were more effective than
threat appeals in encouraging more secure behaviour. The goal of
the present research is to explore the techniques used in cybersecur-
ity campaigns in order to investigate if this research and extortions
towards best practice have influenced the design of governmental
cybersecurity campaigns. In order to do this, we adopt and apply a
standardized taxonomy of behaviour change techniques. In recent
years, there has been a move towards standardization of behavioural
change techniques so that interventions can be more easily coded for
techniques, their quality assessed and future interventions devel-
oped. One of these taxonomies, the Behaviour Change Technique
Taxonomy version 1 (BCTTv1), identified 93 different techniques to
change behaviour [19]. Included techniques range from basic (in-
struction on how to perform the behaviour) to more complex con-
cepts such as self-affirmation, cognitive dissonance and
‘comparative imagining of future outcomes’. As cybersecurity is a
wide area (campaigns we surveyed included behaviours ranging
from cyberbullying to fraud prevention alongside the usual pass-
word guidance), and as governmental campaigns are designed to
reach all layers of society, we would hope that governmental cyber-
security campaigns would incorporate a wide range of behavioural
change techniques to maximize their effectiveness. In this study, we
investigate if this is the case. More specifically, to investigate current
campaigns we surveyed 17 ongoing campaigns and collected evi-
dence on: (i) the goal of governmental cybersecurity campaigns; (ii)
The extent to which these campaigns use evidence-based
behavioural change concepts; and (iii) If there was evidence on the
effectiveness of these campaigns presented publicly.
Methods
Search strategy
To obtain the relevant materials, we searched the web (using the
Google Search Engine) for government-sponsored cybersecurity
campaigns. We define government-sponsored cybersecurity
campaigns as any (temporary or ongoing) initiative that aimed to
improve cybersecurity in end-users through means of mass commu-
nication or the creation of toolkits that could be used by more local
entities to influence smaller communities. Campaigns were included
if they were (partly) in English, the campaign materials were suitable
for the (general) public, and came from either government depart-
ments or wider agencies such as the European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (ENISA). An initial search was
conducted in January 2017, followed by additional searches con-
ducted in October 2018 and December 2019 as in recent years,
more organizations are developing their own awareness campaigns.
This way, the campaigns from these organizations could be included
in our analysis and rudimentary comparisons across years become
possible. Websites that introduced cybersecurity awareness month
and then linked to existing campaigns were excluded (but the source
campaign was included). This led to 17 campaigns being identified
for coding (Table 1).
Information extraction
We recorded the following information for each of the campaigns:
country of origin, governmental department or organization,
website content, other available content, and whether or not effect-
iveness studies had been published. If possible, materials were
downloaded, otherwise screenshots were used to store the relevant
materials.
Campaign coding
First, the extracted information was formalized, and the campaign
materials were coded for type of content (e.g. website, videos, text
and posters). These materials were then coded for behaviour change
content. Content was coded by reviewing all website pages, as well
as embedded videos and attachments provided. First, materials were
coded for their intervention functions according to the Behaviour
Change Wheel [20]. This framework posits nine intervention func-
tions as super-ordinate approaches to behaviour change: education,
persuasion, incentivization, coercion, training, enablement, model-
ling, environmental restructuring and restrictions. To identify the
more fine-grained ‘active ingredients’ of the identified campaigns,
materials were also coded for their presence of Behaviour Change
Techniques, using the Behaviour Change Techniques Taxonomy
version 1 (BCTTv) [19]. BCTTv1 provides terms and definitions for
93 different behaviour change techniques, clustered into 16 different
groups [19]. For example, Group 1 ‘Goals and planning’ consists of
nine behaviour change techniques such as ‘Goal setting (behaviour)’
(BCT 1.1) and ‘Action planning’ (BCT 1.4). Presence of an interven-
tion function and BCT was coded for each given campaign if it
was present at least once in any material. Up to three examples of
identified intervention functions and BCTs were recorded for each
campaign. Coding of intervention functions and behaviour change
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techniques was independently performed by two reviewers who are
experts in behaviour change coding (E.N., K.A.), with discrepan-
cies resolved through discussion. Identified intervention functions
and behaviour change techniques were then collated at campaign
level. Inter-rater reliability of which intervention functions and
BCTs were present in each campaign was calculated using
Prevalence-Adjusted and Bias-Adjusted Kappa (PABAK) [21].
PABAK is used for judgements with 2 raters against 3/þ nominal
categories and has been used in previous research coding behav-
iour change content [22, 23]. Results were interpreted using
Altman’s guidelines: 0.20 poor, 0.21–0.40 fair, 0.41–0.60 mod-
erate, 0.61–0.80 good and 0.81–1.00 very good reliability [24].
Results
The web search identified 19 governmental cybersecurity campaigns
from across the world. Campaign materials were accessible for 17 of
these campaigns. All of these campaigns ran a website where people
can find information about cybersecurity, with some adding real-
world examples or videos. The available materials were limited in
diversity. While some provided videos or information sheets that
could be shared, most focused solely on what we call ‘campaign sta-
tionary’. Campaign stationary includes posters, leaflets, bookmarks,
postcards, etc. that, in many cases, are either variations on a theme
or merely the same message or image in a different format. While
these materials are helpful as reminders (e.g. a poster that can be put
on display in a community centre, postcards that can be sent to rela-
tives, or Facebook ‘badges’ that can be added to profile pictures for
increased exposure), they often do not contain a complete behav-
ioural change attempt. For an overview of the campaigns and types
of materials, see Table 1.
The coding of the materials for intervention function showed
that all 17 campaigns contained content to educate people, such as
advising readers to regularly change their passwords (e.g. Data
Privacy Day campaign). Most campaigns (9/17) featured persuasion,
such as imagery of hackers to induce negative feelings (e.g. Cyber
Security Information Portal, Fig. 1).
Many campaigns (6/17) featured training content with specific,
structured guidance on improving their cybersecurity, such as giving
instructions on how to use specialized file deletion software (e.g.
Information Security Awareness). Fewer campaigns included coer-
cion (2/12) and modelling (1/12) intervention functions. Four of the
nine intervention functions posited by the Behaviour Change Wheel
were not found in identified campaigns; none of the campaigns
attempted to incentivize security behaviour, and no campaign tried
to enable people to become more cyber secure beyond education or
training, i.e. by increasing means or reducing barriers. Given the dis-
tance between government and the end-user, it is unsurprising that
no campaigns attempted to restrict end-users or to restructure the
environment.
A range of different behaviour change techniques (in total, 13)
were present in the campaigns, ranging from zero to seven identified
techniques per campaign. Most campaigns (15/17) included ‘instruc-
tion on how to perform the behaviour’ (BCT 4.1), such as the provi-
sion of checklists for staying safe online (e.g. Cyber Safe 4 You; Get
Cyber Safe,Figure 2) and ‘information about social and emotional
consequences’ (14/17; BCT 5.3), such as giving details on potential
personal and company-level financial loss at not maintaining cyber-
security (e.g. Get Cyber Safe). Some campaigns included practical
social support (4/17; BCT 3.2) such as encouraging parents to work
with their children to install safe Internet usage (e.g. NCSAM
Campaign; 2012–14), recommendations and guidance from a ‘cred-
ible source’ (4/17; BCT 9.1) on how to adopt cybersafe behaviours
(e.g Quarterly Cybersecurity Campaigns) and ‘imaginary punish-
ment’ (4/17; BCT 16:1), such as videos depicting scenarios where
fictional individuals get hacked while using insecure Wi-Fi (e.g. Stop
Think Connect). For an overview of the coded intervention func-
tions and behaviour change techniques per campaign, see Table 2.
Inter-rater reliability was assessed to be very good (0.81–1.00)
for 4/5 identified intervention functions and 9/13 identified behav-
iour change techniques, good (0.61–0.80) for 3/13 identified behav-
iour change techniques, moderate (0.41–0.60) for 1/13 behaviour
change techniques and fair (0.21–0.40) for 1/5 identified interven-
tion functions (Table 2). Effectiveness measurements were found in
the public sphere for only two campaigns, the 2017 National Cyber
Figure 1: Landing page, CSIP (Hong Kong), accessed in 2018.
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Security Awareness Month and the Data Privacy Day initiative,
both in the USA. This measurement consisted of qualitative and
quantitative results relating to various factors such as the reach of
the campaign, the number of visitors to various websites and the
number of (corporate) partnerships. No measurements relating to
(objective) security behaviours were published.
Discussion
The contents of these identified cybersecurity campaigns suggest
that their goal is mainly to increase awareness, with some explicitly
stating so (e.g. the NICCS campaign and other NCSAM initiatives).
This raises the question of why increasing awareness is an important
goal to strive for. Traditionally, awareness campaigns have the
larger goal of changing behaviour through increased awareness [25],
even if they do not explicitly state so. By itself, raising awareness
does not improve the security of end-users or society as a whole and
for this to happen, end-users will need to change their behaviour so
they put more safeguards in place that protect them from (cyber)
harm and that improves their safety when they are online. If the
stated goal is to increase awareness, while actually aiming to im-
prove cybersecurity of end-users, merely attempting to raise aware-
ness will not be effective. There is no evidence that merely increasing
awareness leads to behavioural change. There are various other fac-
tors that need to be taken into account if the goal is to change behav-
iour, as mapped by the intervention functions in the Behavioural
Change Wheel. This means that governments that aim to improve
cybersecurity need to move beyond awareness campaigns and start
incorporating behavioural change theories in their efforts.
Another factor that suggests that the awareness campaigns might
not be sufficient in changing cybersecurity behaviour is that there
seems to be no substantive change between the campaigns in our
most recent searches compared to earlier searches. The number of
behavioural change techniques and intervention functions used in
more recent campaigns mirrors those of the older ones, and the
same holds true for the actual list of techniques and intervention
functions found in the newer campaigns. This suggests that aware-
ness campaigns generally follow the same structure and focus on
similar methods of improving awareness.
When the goal is to improve people’s cybersecurity behaviour, a
starting point would be to upgrade the awareness campaigns so they
focus on specific behaviours. For example, there are fundamental
differences in the threats—and solutions—of romance scams and
ransomware attacks. These different crimes require not only differ-
ent methods to shield end-users from their potential harm, but also
require the targeting of vastly different populations, with their own
pitfalls when it comes to being persuaded by scammers to transfer
money, or to click on a link that installs ransomware on their
computer.
The analysed campaigns seem to target the general public, rather
than focusing on specific populations within society that might be at
a higher risk to become a victim of cybercrime. For example, cam-
paigns that aim to prevent cyberbullying might be more applicable
to school-age children, while campaigns addressing romance scams
might be most effective when designed to target lonely people who
are in need of social contact. The current awareness campaigns
hardly differentiate between vulnerable groups and seem to adopt a
‘one size fits all’ in the manner in which they convey their awareness
message. A similar approach is seen when looking at the range of
cybercrimes they intend to prevent. The found intervention func-
tions and behavioural change techniques seem to be applied to all
Figure 2: Get cyber safe (Canada) smart device checklist, accessed in 2017.
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cybercrimes in similar manners, rather than adopting tailor-made
solutions for each different type of cybercrime.
Not only are the campaigns generic in their assumption that
increasing awareness results in a meaningful change in behaviour,
but the majority of campaigns relied on an assumption that aware-
ness and fear of consequences lead to behaviour change, so long as it
is outlined what the required behaviour is. This approach relies not
only on the target audience being knowledgeable on how to change
their behaviour in order to be more secure, but also on them under-
standing that action A (e.g. updating software) leads to outcome B
(e.g. reducing threat of identity theft). While it is becoming accepted
that awareness itself is not enough to lead to behaviour change [12,
14], there was less evidence that providing ‘coping’ skills (or infor-
mation on the efficacy of relatively simple actions) had increased in
response to recent research and guidelines [14, 18].
Moreover, the coding for behaviour change techniques shows
that the campaigns we surveyed were limited in the range of behav-
iour change techniques they used in order to achieve a change in se-
curity behaviour. Only a small number of techniques were present in
the campaigns, and as most campaigns focused on instructing people
how to act, and explaining possible consequences of (in)secure cyber
behaviour, they did not move particularly far beyond awareness-
raising. As the analysis showed, education was the only intervention
function present in all campaigns. Persuasion was used in half of the
campaigns, training was used occasionally, coercion and modelling
were used rarely, and incentivisation, enablement, environmental
restructuring and restrictions were completely absent in the cam-
paigns. While not all intervention functions might lend themselves
to successful online behaviour change interventions, this finding
shows that there is much ground that can be covered by carefully
planning, designing and executing new cybersecurity campaigns
based on a wider range of intervention functions.
The seeming lack of publicly available evaluations of the success
or otherwise of the campaigns we surveyed is not surprising. As the
campaigns are treated as a way to increase awareness rather than
the more complex goal of changing tangible behaviour, no clear key
performance indicators are present, and presumably internal metrics
focussed on the number of site visits, or perhaps interactions with
social media postings. It is possible that other, more complex metrics
are shared internally, but no publicly available information was dis-
covered that provided further insights into the effectiveness of these
campaigns. Given the distance between governments and end-users,
measuring the effectiveness of such large-scale cybersecurity cam-
paigns beyond reach, the number of website visitors and the like
would be difficult, but not impossible (particularly if designed dur-
ing the planning stages of a campaign).
There are several recommendations to improve governmental
cybersecurity campaigns. First, it is vital that any campaign seeking
to improve citizens’ security behaviour adopts a structured approach
in which each aspect of the decision process to (not) behave securely
is covered, and that seeks to incorporate as many different methods
of influencing these decision processes as possible, in order to reach
a wide audience. To achieve this, campaigns could be created that
focus on specific cybersecurity behaviours and threats, rather than
the wide-ranging awareness campaigns that are used now. These
campaigns can then be more focused on specific target groups,
incorporating messages that resonate more strongly with these pop-
ulations, and also helps to decide on the best platforms to communi-
cate those messages through.
Secondly, the existing knowledge on how to change security
behaviours needs to be incorporated in these campaigns so that the
chance of a campaign being successful is maximized. There is no
one-sizefits-all approach in this, as different behavioural change
techniques can target different aspects of cybersecurity behaviours,
and it is dependent on the focus of the campaign which techniques
should be incorporated. However, a mixture of techniques that
cover the different intervention functions of the Behavioural Change
Wheel seems a sensible starting point for cybersecurity behaviours
that might not have been investigated thoroughly yet.
Thirdly, increasing awareness does not equal a change in behav-
iour. Therefore, the effectiveness of security campaigns needs to be
assessed beyond awareness and reach metrics. Only by direct, be-
havioural measurements can the effectiveness of any security cam-
paign be assessed. A recent ENISA report [14] reviewing evidence of
effective behaviour change interventions to improve cybersecurity
behaviours suggests that rather than focusing on improving threat
perceptions, the focus should lie on coping appraisals. Persuading
people of the effectiveness of specific behaviours to improve cyberse-
curity standards, and providing them with the tools and confidence
to perform these behaviours is more likely to be an effective way of
sustainable cybersecurity behaviours than the focus on the impact
and likelihood of cyber threats.
As it might be difficult to reach the target group to measure their
behaviour in response to the security campaigns, alternatives could
be sought. For example, the campaigns could be distributed in small
samples, controlling exposure to, and interaction with, the materi-
als. Then, the direct effects of these campaigns on security behaviour
can be tested. These effects should be tested on various levels so that
in the case of an unsuccessful cybersecurity campaign, the effective-
ness measures can provide insights as to why the campaign did not
change actual behaviour. To ensure this, a combination of direct be-
havioural measures (e.g. number of people signing up for a training,
or the percentage of people reporting a potential phishing email),
intentions (e.g. questions on how an individual would act, if they
find themselves in a potentially harmful situation), attitudes (e.g.
attitudes towards the likelihood and severity of cyber threats such as
ransomware) and awareness (e.g. reach of the campaign, whether
people remember the message of the campaign materials) is needed.
Combined, these tests can lead to an evidence-based approach to
cybersecurity that incorporates various pathways to influence a di-
verse target group such as the general population. Additionally, ra-
ther than campaign stationary being used as reminders of
campaigns, they could be designed so that they are standalone inter-
ventions that do not require additional knowledge, information or
access to specific websites. This way, every part of the campaign
that is distributed can independently add to the end goal of
improved cybersecurity.
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